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 Prescriptive use of Environmental Indices:  




A framework for analyzing conservation programs that rank applications using environmental indices is 
presented. We derive the optimal bid from the farmer’s perspective for both land retirement and working 
lands agri-environmental payment programs and we analyze how these solutions depend on program 
design parameters. The distinction is made between environmental objectives based on whether the 
farmer exercises control or not over the level proposed in a bid to participate in a program. The 
optimization model is solved analytically for two cases – a land retirement and a working lands program – 
highlighting the differences in the results. 
 




  Agri-environmental programs provide benefits in multiple environmental dimensions. 
Acknowledging this fact, programs increasingly rank producer applications by using environmental 
indices. The underlying assumption of the ranking system is that the environmental index, by weighting 
and aggregating an array of environmental indicators into a single output, represents a preference ordering 
on environmental states. This paper provides a framework for analyzing how producers’ incentives to 
participate in a conservation program are affected by the specifics of the environmental index used to rank 
applications. 
The best known instance of this approach is the U.S. Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) used to 
rank Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) applications. A lesser known case, but growing in importance 
due to increased funding, is the ranking adopted by the U.S. Environmental Quality Incentives Program 
(EQIP). Design issues for these programs fall under the general rubric of government procurement of 
environmental goods. The extent of potential participants combined with the multiple dimensions of 
environmental goods requires the government adopt a simple standardized approach for evaluating 
applications; hence the environmental index approach.  
Until now, the literature has focused on cost-effectiveness of specific environmental measures 
(Feng et al., 2004; Wu and Babcock, 1996), on different forms of environmental targeting (Wu and 
Babcock, 2001), on the moral hazard involved in conservation contracts (Ozanne et al., 2001; White, 
2002), and the use of auctions in conservation programs as a way of decreasing farmers’  information 
rents (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1998; Cattaneo, 2003) . The paper presented here builds 
on the literature and moves forward the debate by analysing theoretical aspects for a conservation 
program using an environmental index to rank applications. Given that environmental ranking in a 
systematic way is a relatively recent development, no literature addresses how it might be done. In 
particular, very little is known on how the environmental index approach affects the environmental 
improvements being proposed by applicants. This gap, which this paper attempts to fill, is important 
considering that over the next 6 years upwards of $10 billion will be spent in the U.S. on agri-
environmental conservation measures decided upon by environmental ranking. 
  The paper provides a framework with which to analyze the impact of agri-environmental program 
design parameters on farmers incentives to participate in the program. It focuses, in particular, on how the 
weights used in an index influence the type of bids submitted into a program. The analysis represents a 
first step towards understanding the strategic issues to be considered when constructing an environmental 
index for prescriptive purposes.  
The paper presents and discusses the necessary conditions for an interior solution in the general 
case by solving the Lagrangean. The remaining part of the paper analyzes in detail two sub-cases: (i) a 
CRP-like land retirement case where the decision variables are the environmental performance provided in the bid and the rental rate requested, and (ii) a working lands program with environmental performance 
and cost-share request as variables. These two-variable problems accurately reflect existing programs and 
have the added advantage of being analytically tractable.  
 
Ranking agri-environmental application using an index: A framework for farmers’ response 
 
The index approach to designing an agri-environmental program weighs the different objectives of 
interest such that a score can be computed for each producer's application to participate in the program 
and accept the best applications accordingly. Weighing the objectives and computing an application's 
score are simply the final steps of the process from a program design perspective. Developing an index 
that aggregates multiple-dimensional information into a single summary output requires the following 
steps: (i) choice of indicator variables, (ii) assignment of unit scale for each indicator , (iii) functional 
form used to aggregate the indicator variables into a single summary output for evaluation purposes, and 
(iv)  weights signaling tradeoffs. Here we focus exclusively on the role of the weights as program design 
parameters. 
The approach taken develops an optimization problem for a producer thinking about participating 
in an agri-environmental program that ranks applications using an index.  
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The problem definition is general enough to describe actual agri-environmental programs. In the 
general case, a producer faces a problem with three decision variables: the endogenous environmental 
performance for the bid (eenv), the cost-share rate to request (s), and the rental rate for the environmental 
benefit provided (r).  The parameters and functions included in the model are: 
I     Index  score 
() FI      Probability of a bid being accepted as a function of index score 
() env h e   Cost  of  installing  environmental  improvements 
  I     Maximum  attainable  score 
  01 and ππ     Profits from agricultural activity before and after bid acceptance 
0 e       exogenous environmental component over which producer has no control 
0,, , env s r w ww w    Weights assigned respectively to exogenous environmental performance,  
         endogenous environmental performance, cost-share request, rental request max s     Maximum  allowable  cost-share 
() max env r e     Maximum allowable rent is function of environmental performance 
 
In words, the way the index operates is that the higher the exogenous and the endogenous environmental 
performance, the greater the score, and the better the chances of a bid being accepted, and the lower the 
cost-share and rental rate requested, the better chances a bid has. The producer’s decision problem is to 
maximize the expected outcome of a bid, which is expressed as the product of the change in returns if the 
bid is accepted and the probability of acceptance. The inequality constraints simply represent the 
allowable range for the decision variables. 
The reason for introducing an exogenous environmental component (e0) is that often producers 
wanting to submit a bid have control only over a subset of the environmental factors being weighted by 
the ranking process. For example, in CRP producers have no control over how many soil erosion points 
their bid receives because it is purely dependent on location. Conversely, they do control their wildlife 
habitat score because it is linked to what cover they would introduce upon entering CRP. For some 
programs past stewardship can be treated as an exogenous environmental component in the bid 
application. 
Setting up the Lagrangean (see Appendix) one obtains the following necessary conditions for an 
interior solution: 
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The implication of the first condition is that, for an interior solution, the marginal cost to the farmer of 
participating in the program (LHS in eq. 3)  is linked to two factors: the first is the relative weight 
assigned to the environmental and cost components of the bid and on the extent to which the maximum 
rental rate allowed reflects the environmental benefits provided, the second factor depends on the share 
requested of the maximum allowed rental rate and on whether the rental rate increases with environmental 
benefits provided so as to cover the increasing cost. Intuitively, the first component highlights that the 
greater (i) the environmental weight and (ii) the maximum allowable rental rate, the more conservation 
will be proposed by farmers because it increases their expected financial benefit from applying. The 
second component implies that the greater the share requested of the maximum allowable rental rate, and 
the more the allowable rental rate increases with the environmental benefits provided, the more 
conservation will be provided.  
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Where  () ce n v e η  and 
max() r env e η  are the elasticity of cost and rental rate, respectively, relative to the 
environmental performance. The cost elasticity expresses a farmer’s change in cost as greater 
environmental performance is written into an application. The rental rate elasticity, instead, is a program 
design parameter by which policymakers express how the rental rate provided by the program varies with 
environmental performance delivered by farmers.  
The second necessary condition expresses the optimal environmental performance (from the perspective 
of a farmer applying to participate) as depending on both the cost component faced by the farmer and the 
rental rate requested. The two terms on the right hand side of Equation 4 can be viewed as balancing the 
profitability of participating in the program and maximizing the probability of the application being 
accepted. An analytical solution to the farmer participation decision can be obtained for special cases of 
the general problem. The next section investigates the properties of the analytical solution for examples 
representative of different types of conservation programs.  
 
 
 Land retirement vs. working lands programs: insights from applying the framework 
  In what follows, two special cases are considered: the first is representative of a land retirement 
program, bearing considerable resemblance with the U.S. Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), and the 
second example outlines the approach for a working lands program. In the discussion of the two cases 
several additional assumptions are made concerning the functional forms for the probability of acceptance 
(F(I)) and the cost of installing environmental improvements (h(eenv)). For the acceptance of a bid with 
score I we assume a uniformly distributed probability density, which translates into a piecewise linear 

















−    =∈    − 
 > 
                                                 (eq. 5) 
Where Isrej is the value of I below which a bid is surely rejected, and Isacc is the value of I above which a 
bid is surely accepted. The assumption seems reasonable to the extent that F(I) represents the probability 
of acceptance perceived by the farmer, who will likely have an idea of what index score will get an 
application approved for sure, and what score will be rejected for sure. A linear interpolation between 
these two extremes seems a plausible assumption in terms of how a farmer would assess the chance of a 
bid being accepted. 
For the cost of installing environmental improvements we assume either that costs increase 
linearly or quadratically with environmental performance. Only the quadratic cost increases are presented 
here since the linear ones are but a special case that can be obtained by the reader by setting the quadratic 
component to zero. These additional assumptions enable us to verify the second order conditions 
(Hessian), and examine corner solutions where appropriate.  
 
Land Retirement Programs  
It is typically the case for land retirement programs to provide a rental payment  based on the profitability 
of the land to be retired, and not the environmental benefits provided. The first simplification we can 
introduce is then to assume that  max r , which represents the maximum rental rate a farmer can request, 
does not depend on the environmental performance of the bid. The second assumption is that the cost-
share is fixed as a percentage-rate of the cost of installing the new vegetative practices listed in the bid, 
and therefore, the farmer does not have the option of proposing a lower cost-share rate to enhance the 
chances of being accepted in the program. The two assumptions imply:  () max env max r er =  and   max s s = . 
Equation 3 then simplifies to: 
 







′ −⋅ =                                                               (eq.6) 
Assuming a cost structure for installing different practices provides some additional insight in terms of 
the optimal values for r and eenv. A quadratic cost of improving environmental performance through more 
elaborate conservation practices is a reasonable option assuming an increasing marginal cost of installing 
better practices. We therefore assume the following:    () (1 ) env env env h ee e αβ =⋅+⋅ ⋅  with α  
representing the linear parameter, andβ  the quadratic parameter. 
  The interior solution, in terms of r and eenv , for a farmer wanting to participate in a land 
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where rmin is the minimum payment a farmer would accept for him to participate, taking into 
consideration per hectare profit foregone from retiring land, and rpeps  is the rental rate at which the 
probability of being accepted is a value epsilon just greater than 0 (see appendix for derivation). The 
necessary condition for this interior solution to be valid is: (see appendix for derivation): 
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First we analyze optimal environmental performance based on eq. 7: 





the higher the optimal endogenous environmental 
performance provided by the farmer because the environmental objective is increasingly 
important relative to the cost of a bid.  
2)  environmental performance provided in a bid will tend to increase when the maximum allowable 
rental rate for the parcel is high (obtained by Differentiating Eq. 7 relative to rmax: the derivative is 
always positive);  
3)  similarly, optimal environmental performance provided in a bid will tend to increase when the 
cost-share for installing practices is high. 
The optimal environmental performance does not depend directly on the weight assigned to the 





 will depend on w0. The impact of changing the weight of the exogenous environmental component, 
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                                                   (eq. 10) 
indicating, as one would expect, that the endogenous component of environmental provision decreases as 
greater weight is given to the exogenous environmental component. Several less obvious conclusions can 
be drawn: (i) farmers in high rental rate counties (higher rmax) will tend to be more sensitive -- in terms of 
the endogenous environmental performance they offer -- to the relative weights of the two environmental 
components; (ii) environmental improvements with a high rate of increase in marginal cost per unit of 
environmental performance will be less sensitive to shifts in w0   and wenv. 
The optimal rental rate for a farmer to request is less straightforward to analyze than environmental 
performance. The expression (Eq. 8) can be broken down in two components:  
                                                           
1 The logic behind choosing this special case in terms of how weights interact is that policymakers will typically 
weigh the environmental component against the cost component. Whether the degree of provision of an 
environmental objective is in farmers’ control  or not has not, up to now, been a program design consideration. Note 
that if w0 varies so that wenv/wr is unaffected, then eenv does not change.  •   the first component sets the rental rate at midway between the break even rental rate (rmin) and the 
rental rate at which the probability of being accepted is a value epsilon just greater than 0 (rpeps). ;  
















 (this follows from 
necessary conditions for an interior solution (Eq. 9)).  
An intuitive interpretation is that the first term determines a “reasonable” rental rate for the farmer – 
above the breakeven point and with a good chance of acceptance (once eenv is known). The second term 
can be viewed as an environmental benefit payment: it adjusts the reasonable rental rate to account for the 
level of environmental performance actively provided by the farmer. 
Special cases and corner solutions: 
•   As a special case, if costs of environmental improvements are linear ( 0 β = ) the condition for an 
interior solution becomes extremely restrictive; if the producer provides environmental performance 
(eenv>0) it is optimal to request the maximum rental rate. The producer’s decision to provide a non-
zero environmental performance depends on the ratio wenv/wr. The only case in which an interior 
solution can exist is for 





= ; however, these are all parameters determined 
exogenously either through program design or farmers’ cost constraints. 
•   The corner-solutions when costs increase quadratically are such that: (i) if  wenv/wr  is below the 
range for which an interior solution exists then eenv=0, and  
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•   or (ii) if  wenv/wr  is above the specified range then either r=rmax, or eenv=1and the other has to be 
determined numerically as the root of a quadratic equation.  
These results are relevant in an applied context because the Conservation Reserve Program retired 
approximately 28 million acres on the basis of EBI ranking. The EBI ranks CRP offers by weighing 
program costs for enrolling land in CRP against six environmental objectives (Land Cover, Water 
Quality, Erosion Control, Enduring Benefits, Air Quality, and State or National Conservation Priority 
Areas). The results are consistent with an analysis by Cattaneo et al. (2002) reporting that the aggregate 
environmental index associated with land enrolled in CRP had a positive relationship with the weights 
assigned to wildlife benefits and enduring benefits, which are the ones under producers’ control, but not 
with the weights for other environmental indicators (exogenous performance).   
 
In Figure 1(a)-1(d) we present the decision surfaces for a hypothetical farmer wanting to submit a bid 
in the Conservation Reserve Program. The value for CRP of the parameters in our analysis are: 
0.268 r w = ,  0.205 env w = ,  0 0.527 w =  based on the share of points assigned in the Environmental 
Benefits Index (EBI) 
Isrej = 240 (value of EBI below which a bid is surely rejected), and  
Isacc=280 (value of EBI above which a bid is “surely” accepted     
We assume the farmer’s bid to be in a county where the net present value for soil adjusted rental rate 
is $165/acre (rmax), and we provide two alternative cost structures: high cost conservation cover 
practices and low cost ones. We also portray two different levels of exogenous environmental 







































































































































































































Figure 1. Expected profit isoclines for a farmers participation in a hypothetical land retirement 
program under different conservation cost assumptions and exogenous environmental performance. 
(a) 
(c)  (d) 
(b) Based on the numerical assumptions in the box above, we simulated the decision surface of our 
hypothetical case, so as to map the expected profit isoclines and observe how bids are affected by the cost 
of conservation practices and how much exogenous environmental perfomance happens to be associated 
with the land being offered (concentric ellipses with the center being the maximum). . 
From this simple numerical example, we check that the conditions derived for an interior solution 
are , in fact, valid. We also observe that if a farmer has land with greater exogenous environmental 
performance upon retirement, effectively broadens the area with positive expected profits. This means 
producers can choose from a broader range of bids with a positive outcome (even though only one 
maximizes the expected profit). Furthermore, for an interior solution changing the exogenous 
environmental performance (or weight) affects the rental rate requested (payments) but does not affect the 
amount of endogenous environmental performance provided in a bid (as per eq. 7). Figures 1(c) and 1(d) 
portray how, with lower costs of installing cover practices, a change in the exogenous environmental 
performance of a bid can have an impact on both the rental rate requested and the endogenous 
environmental performance offered in a bid. The higher the exogenous component, the lower will be the 
endogenous environmental component, and the higher the rental rate requested. 
 
Working Land Payment Programs  
Working lands payment programs (WLPPs), by allowing continued production, do not need to provide 
rental rate payments to make up for lost production. Instead WLPPs typically provide a cost-share 
payment to defray administrative and installation costs of conservation practices. Due to information 
asymmetries program managers may decide to introduce a bidding mechanism whereby farmers propose 
contracts with lower cost share rates than the maximum allowed. The bidding down of the cost-share is 
meant to elicit producers willingness-to-accept a payment. The lack of a rental payment in WLPPs 
implies that in our model  () 0 max env re=  and   0 r w = . In a WLP the exogenous environmental 
component can be interpreted as conservation practices that have already been installed by the farmer 
(good stewardship). Equation 4 is the relevant necessary condition, which simplifies to:  
(1 )







=⋅                                                     (eq. 12) 
and we assume, as in the case of the land retirement example, a piecewise linear cumulative distribution 































                                                          (eq. 13) 
This solution, however, upon checking the Hessian, is for all intents and purposes a saddle point, meaning 
that the maximum is not an interior solution and that farmers will tend to submit applications in one of the 
following categories: 
(i) Good stewards: s=0  
In this case the farmer is not asking for any cost-share from the program, although part of the difference 
in profits may derive from a flat payment from participation. 
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(ii) Maximum cost recovery: s=smax 
Here we find that some farmers have an interest in providing greater environmental benefits, but only if 
the full allowable cost-share is obtained. 
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(iii) Maximum environmental performance: eenv=1 
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where, eq. 16 has no solution since both terms are negative,  and therefore the cost-share rate is either s=0 
or s=smax 
 
(iv) Rewarding past stewardship: eenv =0 
In this case the program is paying () 1 0 ππ −  for good past stewardship in the form of the exogenous 
environmental component ( 0 e ). 
 
The most policy-relevant cases will be the intermediate ones (i) and (ii) because they will be more 
common than the extreme cases in which endogenous environmental performance of a bid is either zero 
or at its maximum. Furthermore it will be informative to know when a maximum cost recovery solution is 
preferred (by producers) to a good stewardship option, which will come at a lower cost but provide lower 
endogenous environmental performance. To do this we must find where the maximum cost-recovery 
solution  ** [, ] env max e s  provides greater expected profits than the good stewardship solution   *
0 [, ] env e s , which by 
(dis)equating the objectives for cases (i) and (ii) implies: 
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 is a sufficient condition for the higher endogenous environmental, higher cost-share solution to be 
optimal from the farmers’ perspective.  The condition provides only an order of magnitude indication: it 
informs what the minimum difference in endogenous environmental performance between the two 
solutions must be for the higher endogenous environmental performance to be guaranteed. The larger the 
left-hand side of the inequality, the greater the difference has to be between the two environmental 
solutions for the higher environmental improvement to be offered. The difference between the two levels 
of environmental improvement essentially has to compensate for (i) the additional cost-share associated 
with higher endogenous environmental improvements, and (ii) the level of exogenous environmental 
improvements being provided. 
 
 
In Figures 2(a) and 2(b) the saddle-point nature of the solution is evident: shifting the weight associated 
with the cost-share component from 0.10 to 0.04 causes a switch in the preferred level of endogenous 
environmental performance from 0.2 (at zero cost-share) to 0.55 (at maximum cost-share). In Figure 2(b) 
we observe, instead, how at medium conservation costs the incentive is to provide the maximum 
environmental performance trying to recuperate as much as possible of the conservation practice costs. 
When costs are low (3(d)) the tendency is to provide high environmental performance at zero cost-share. 
(The large areas in pale blue represent the zero expected profit from participation, all other isoclines 
represent a positive expected profit). 
 
In Figure 2(a)-2(d) we present the decision surfaces for a hypothetical farmer wanting to submit a 
bid in an EQIP-like working lands payment program. The value of the parameters in our analysis 
are: 
For 2(a) , 2(c), and 2(d)  0.04 s w = ,  0.50 env w = ,  0 0.46 w =  ,  
For 2(b) )    0.10 s w = ,  0.50 env w = ,  0 0.4 w =  ,  
which put a slightly greater emphasis on new environmental improvements than on past 
stewardship, and provide some variation in cost-share weight. We assume a maximum total of 100 
points and that:  
Isrej = 35 (value of EBI below which a bid is surely rejected), and  
Isacc=80 (value of EBI above which a bid is “surely” rejected     
We assume smax=0.75, and that the farmer increases profits by $50/acre. This increase in profits can 
be due to either improved returns from conservation and/or payments for good stewardship from the 
WLPP. We also portray three cost structures: 
For 2(a) and 2(b):   high conservation costs  [α =20, β =15]  
Figure 2(c) :    medium conservation costs [α =3, β =15]  










































































































































































































































































































































(a) High cons. Costs & ws=0.10 
(d) low cons. costs & ws =0.04  (c) Medium cons. costs & ws =0.04 
(b) High cons. Costs & ws=0.04 
Figure 2. Expected profit isoclines for a farmers participation in a hypothetical land working 
lands payment program under different conservation cost assumptions and exogenous 
environmental performance. Policy implications - The formulation for the working land case is combines conceptual design elements 
of both the U.S. Environmental Quality Incentives Program  (EQIP) and of the U.S. Conservation 
Security Program (CSP). Bidding down the cost-share was an integral part of  EQIP at its inception in 
1996, while rewarding good stewardship is a new element in U.S. agri-environmental policy that was 
introduced by CSP.   
  The importance of the results presented here derive from the fact that these are voluntary 
programs. Therefore, a crucial component of the success of a program is to receive applications that 
match well the program objectives. It will typically be the case that new environmental improvements are 
sought by the program. This would entail lower weights on cost-share and exogenous environmental 
performance (stewardship), and higher allowable cost-share rates. If a program is geared more towards 
rewarding good stewardship then the reverse will be true.  These results are not surprising; however, the 
fact that there is no interior solution implies that changing a parameter even by a small amount may alter 
what a farmer proposes as a bid in a substantial way. So, for example, reducing the cost share rate to save 
money may have the undesirable effect of farmers proposing much lower endogenous environmental 
performance. This is the case for Figure 2(b), which depicts a 0.75 cost share and the farmer providing a 
bid with a 0.55 endogenous environmental performance (eep). Reducing the cost share rate to 0.5 makes 
it optimal for the farmer to submit a bid with a 0.25 eep. A 33% change in cost share reduces by 50% the 
eep of the bid (but it also reduces the government payments were the bid to be accepted). 
 
Conclusions  
The results presented focus on finding the optimal solution to the program participation problem based on 
how the environmental index interacts with producers’ characteristics. The main goal, however, is 
providing a framework to analyze how producers’ incentives to participate in a conservation program are 
affected by the specifics of the application evaluation procedure.   
The distinction is made between environmental objectives based on whether the farmer exercises 
control or not over the level proposed in a bid to participate in a program. The reason for introducing an 
exogenous environmental component is that often producers wanting to submit a bid have control only 
over a subset of the environmental factors being weighted by the ranking process. For example, in land 
retirement programs, soil erosion is likely to be one of the objectives, but farmers have no control over 
how many soil erosion points their bid receives because it is purely dependent on location. Conversely, 
they do control their wildlife habitat score because it is linked to what cover they would introduce upon 
entering CRP. For working lands programs, an increasing importance is being attributed to past 
stewardship. This too can be treated as an exogenous environmental component in the bid application 
since the farmer has no control today over past environmental management decisions.  
We derive the optimal bid from the farmer’s perspective for both land retirement and working 
lands agri-environmental payment programs and we analyze how these solutions depend on program 
design parameters. For land retirement programs we conclude that, for the cases considered, the 
exogenous environmental performance does not affect the endogenous environmental performance 
offered in a bid, but it does impact the rental rate requested. A higher weight assigned to objectives falling 
under the exogenous environmental performance category will tend to reduce endogenous environmental 
performance, and farmers in higher rental rate counties will tend to be more sensitive to this dualism. 
For working lands payments programs we find there is no interior solution to the decision 
problem, which generates a dichotomy between sets of parameters that either favor bidding based on past 
stewardship and low payments, or favor providing bids with higher endogenous environmental 
performance but requesting the maximum allowable payment. A necessary condition is derived for the 
latter case to apply.  A numerical examples highlights that reducing the cost share can have more than 
proportionate impacts on the endogenous environmental performance offered by farmers. So reducing the 
cost-share provided might, in fact, negatively affect the cost-effectiveness of a program. 
Further applications of this framework might consider the impact of adopting a tiered payment 
structure based on environmental benefits, or of producers’ perceived uncertainty in terms of what score 
is necessary to be accepted into a program.   
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 Appendices  
 
A1. Deriving rental rate requested (Equation 8) 
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based on Equation 2, adapted for the land retirement example: 
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by substituting Imin for I we obtain the upper limit of r for which there is a non-zero probability of an 
application being accepted: 
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A2. Land retirement: Necessary Conditions for an interior solution (quadratic cost of conservation)  
Based on Equation 7, and having defined environmental performance (eenv) to be in the range [0,1], we 
can state that for eenv <1 the following must apply: 
    








    






Similarly for eenv >0 the following must apply: 











    






Therefore the necessary conditions, relative to eenv, for an interior solution are:  
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A3. Working lands program: Obtaining the sufficient condition for the higher environmental 
improvement solution.  
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substituting the f.o.c for the two cases (equations 15 & 16) to obtain: 
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